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Abstract 
Using seven alternative measures of the institutions, this study examines the impacts of the 
quality of institutions on poverty rates in developing countries. The estimates obtained using the 
instrumental variable method (2SLS) show that the quality of institutions is negatively related 
with poverty rates and explain a significant portion of the variation in poverty rates across 
countries. More precisely, the empirical results suggest that an economy with a robust system to 
control corruption, market-friendly policies, a working judiciary system, and in which people 
have freedom to exercise their citizenship will create the necessary conditions to promote 
economic development and reduce poverty. The results suggest that pro-poor policies aimed at 
reducing poverty should first consider improving the quality of institutions in developing 
countries as a pre-requisite for economic development and poverty eradication. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A fundamental challenge for the economics profession lies in explaining poverty and 
economic development. Why do about 2 billion people live on less than $2 per day? Why is 
average income in the United States 70 times greater than the average income in Tanzania? 
Differences in human capital, physical capital, and natural resource endowments have 
traditionally occupied a central role in answering these questions and explaining economic 
development. Lately, institutions and their impact on the economy have become focal points in 
the economic growth literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Beck et 
al., 2000; Henisz, 2000; Chong and Calderon, 2000a; Acemoglu, et al., 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004; Durham, 2004; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 
2008). Various studies have shown that institutions do impact economic growth, which is a 
necessary condition for poverty reduction (Ravallion and Chen, 2003; Kakwani and Pernia, 
2000; Klasen, 2008; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Enders and Hoover, 2003).  Institutions also affect 
the distribution of economic growth benefits across various levels of social and political groups 
in a society. In fact, studies have shown that despite similar economic growth rates, poverty 
reduction differ substantially among nations (Lopez, 2004). Therefore, poor institutions will not 
only hinder economic growth, but also affect poverty incidence across countries.  This may lead 
to institutions driven poverty traps. Thus, poor institutional structure directly or indirectly leads 
to poverty path dependence. 
This article discusses the theoretical links between institutions and poverty and estimates 
the impacts of the quality of institutions on poverty. This research contributes to the literature on 
the subject in two respects. First, this paper is the first of its kind to use seven alternative 
measures of institutions (Worldwide Governance Indicators) to examine the links between 
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poverty and institutions. Second, we introduce a new instrument (early human capital 
accumulation) that helps us to circumvent the endogeneity problem that plagues most of the 
poverty/institutions empirical research. The study attempt to answer questions like the following: 
i) does the quality of institutions impact poverty rates in developing countries? ii) which set of 
institutions is more conducive to reduce poverty?, and  iii) do geographic-related variables have 
both a direct and an indirect effect on poverty through current institutions? 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theory and 
conceptual framework linking poverty to quality of institutions.  Section 3 outlines the empirical 
model and the intrinsic challenges in conducting empirical evaluations on institutions and 
reviews the difficulties in defining and measuring institutions. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results, and section 5 summarizes the paper’s findings.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The availability of quantitative measures of the quality of institutions contributed to the 
rise of a new front of empirical research. However, empirical studies on poverty and institutions 
are still very limited. The major findings/studies examining the links between poverty and 
institutions are discussed below. 
Breton (2004), using the Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s augmented version of the Solow 
model, and adding institutional variables (government integrity and government share of national 
consumption), offer some justification as to why some nations remain poor, while others do not. 
The author show that lower efficiency in supplying consumer goods and services (government 
share of national consumption) reduces total factor productivity (TFP), thus lowers national 
income. However, using British colony’s experience as a proxy for government integrity, Breton 
shows that the causality runs more from government integrity to national income than the other 
3 
 
way around.  In order to help the poorest nation, Sachs (2003) argues that institutions and 
endowment (geography) play an equal role in devising development policies. Grindle (2004) 
shows that good governance is a pre-requisite for poverty alleviation. The study argues that to 
achieve good governance it is crucial: (i) institutions that establish sets of laws between political 
and economic agents, (ii) establishments that administer public services, (iii) human capital that 
staff government bureaucracies, and (iv) transparency and interface of authorities and the public. 
Grindle reiterates that in order to achieve good governance, thorough knowledge of the 
development of institutions and governmental ability or competence is imperative. 
Chong and Calderon (2000b) offer empirical support of the link between institutional 
quality and poverty. They contended that governance structure and operational cost of 
institutional reform initially impose high cost on the society especially the poor.  The authors 
argue that the transaction cost of the reform would significantly amplify the poverty prior to 
decreasing it gradually. Using 1960-1990 cross-country data, the study found that efficient 
institutions reduce the level, rigor, and prevalence of poverty. 
Bastiaensen et al. (2005) relates poverty to institutions by using a social-constructivist 
approach. Here, the authors point out that political process determines citizen’s rights.  
Accordingly, sustainable poverty reduction requires understanding the local agents involved in 
the institutional landscape. By using two antipoverty programs (Nicaragua and Cameroon) as 
case points, the authors assert that pro-poor institutional change should come within the local 
actors of the nation and not from external interventions. Further, they show that inefficient 
interface between external authorities, internal authorities, and the institutional delivery 
processes itself are reinforcing the local structures of poverty.  
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On the theoretical side, there is a large literature examining poverty and institutions. For 
the sake of simplicity, we focus our discussion on two major ways that institutions can influence 
poverty. First, poor institutions create market inefficiency, where the market is unable to 
generate proficient output for the society. Second, the poor structure of the institution itself could 
be the basis for inefficiencies. Due to its resilience and path dependence, institutional failure 
could lead to a poverty trap. Probable causes of poverty trap could be attributed to two 
underpinning institutional related mechanisms: the formal and informal rules arguments.  
 The formal rule argument relies on the idea that a set of formal institutions govern 
economic performance and resource allocation among economic agents. McGill (1995) points 
out that institutions are essential to the development process, and development in turn is 
perceived as a political process. Rodrik (2000) argues that a participatory democratic political 
system is the foundation for building good institutions, thus high quality economic growth.  
Moreover, formal institutional laws might be created not to serve the interest of social optimum, 
but  rather the private optimum. When authorities use their legal but discretionary power for 
awarding legitimate or illegitimate rewards to their cronies, this might lead to economic 
inefficiency (North, 1993). Inequality in the allotment of political power to the educated might 
create inequity in income distribution, resulting in the uneducated being trapped in poverty 
(Chong and Calderon, 2000b).  One notable characteristic of the poor is lack of power and 
influence created by formal institutions. Thus, institutions which are created to solve the 
inefficient market outcomes may itself create market failure. Bastiaensen et al. (2005) pointed 
out that poverty depends on how well people are represented in the political processes that 
establish, guarantee, and contest people’s entitlements. 
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On the other hand, in many societies, numerous informal institutional customs and 
ideology form the base of community.  Indirectly, this leads to the institutional path dependence, 
which could be a major reason for poverty incidence. In some cases, the inability to escape from 
the surrounding societal institutional norms often lock in individuals to flocking behavior. 
Sindzingre (2005) demonstrates that social institutions and norms have a vital role in affecting 
poverty because institutions mediate the impacts of economic transformations (e.g. globalization) 
and the distribution of economic outcomes.  Sen (1981, 1999) argues that the effectiveness of 
institutional arrangements depends primarily upon the “capabilities” and “entitlements” of the 
social actors.  In this case, institutions will determine how efficient and equitably resources are 
allocated to the poor and how well the needy social actors are able to access their resource’s 
share.  Failure of either one of the above could lead to poverty incidence.   
There are cases where poverty perseveres in the face of progressive economic growth in 
some nations.  In this case, the rationalization that we might put forward is the role of institutions 
that indirectly discriminate against the poor. Malicious institutions (fraudulent governments, 
commercial monopolies, local opportunistic oligarchs, manipulative loan sharks) are the root 
cause of poverty.  
Tebaldi and Mohan (2008) develop an institution augmented Solow model that 
formalizes the idea that poor institutions (formal or informal) might cause poverty traps. Their 
theoretical model suggests that poor institutions decrease the efficacy of technology and reduces 
both labor and capital productivity. In particular, they argue that “poor institutional arrangements 
(translated into corruption and poor enforcement of laws and contracts) decrease the returns to 
investments and affect capital accumulation.”  Figure 1 shows the institutions augmented Solow 
steady state diagram modified to account for quality of institution considered by Tebaldi and 
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Mohan (2008).  Figure 1 demonstrates that there are two steady states indicated by 
*
Pk and 
*
Rk .  
The lower steady state 
*
Pk  can be interpreted as the poverty trap; a country with poor quality of 
institutions (T1) and low levels of capital.  This country will grow until reaching 
*
Pk  and stuck at 
that point.  On the other hand, a country with identical initial conditions (economic bequests and 
saving rate), but endowed with better institutions (T2) will grow steadily reaching a high steady 
state 
*
Rk . Therefore, this simple model suggests that poor institutions may create poverty traps 
and the only way to escape is through improvements in quality of institutions. This result is 
consistent with North (1990), which questioned the inability of societies to eradicate an eventual 
inferior institutional framework that prevents countries to converge as predicted by neoclassical 
theory. 
<<Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
3.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Empirical Model 
We rely on the literature discussed above to develop empirical estimates of the impacts of 
the quality of institutions on poverty and follow the empirical strategy proposed by Hall and 
Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) to model the relationship between poverty and 
institutions as:  
tititi TP ,,10,
ˆ    (1) 
where t represents time, i indexes countries, P denotes poverty  rate, Tˆ  is an index that measures 
the quality of institutions and v is random disturbance.    
Because T is measured contemporaneously, it is endogenous. This undermines the 
reliability of estimates obtained by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). To circumvent this problem, a 
 
 
7 
 
set of instruments for institutions that are correlated with current institutions but uncorrelated 
with poverty should be used. The empirical literature on institutions suggests that much of the 
variation in current institutions can be explained by geography-related variables and historically 
determined factors such as colonial status and origin of the legal system (Hall and Jones, 1999; 
La Porta et al., 1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2005). Figure 2 graphically summarizes these ideas and shows the link between colonization, 
geography and human capital with current institutions, and the forward-link between the quality 
of current institutions and poverty incidence. 
<<Insert Figure 2 about here >> 
Figure 2 suggests that early institutions were influenced by geography because the 
colonization process endogenously acted in response to certain environmental surroundings, thus 
creating institutions accustomed to the colony’s geography (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  Denoon 
(1983) and Acemoglu et al., (2001) argue that geographically disadvantaged settlement colonies 
were subject to heavy burden of infectious diseases. This discouraged the creation of institutions 
aimed at protecting private property. However, colonies with better geographical conditions were 
able to engage in processes that replicated European-type settlements and social adaptation. This 
ultimately helped develop better institutions and paved the way to initiate systems that protect 
private property rights. Denoon (1983) further contended that many settler colonies’ early 
institutions form the basis of the current modern institutions.  In addition, Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2003) strongly believe that unfavorable geography destructively impacts growth-
promoting institutional development.  
La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that a country’s current institutional arrangements have 
historical ties with the predetermined origin of the legal system. The authors divide the legal 
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systems into: British common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law 
and socialist (Soviet Union) law.  The authors found that countries with French or socialist laws 
show signs of inferior government operation and achievement. In general, countries with 
socialist law provide less political, economic and social freedom.  Comparatively, a majority of 
the other legal systems have less domineering government and favor economic and social 
freedom. Thus, the origin of legal systems based on colonial legacy distinguishes the role of the 
current institutions in establishing regulatory systems, defending property rights, and fostering 
political freedom. 
Furthermore, the initial human capital endowment may have affected early institutions 
which ultimately formed current institutions. Because current poverty is a function of existing 
institutions, initial human capital could have an indirect effect on poverty via current institutions. 
This proposition is motivated by the work of Bernard Mandeville (early 1700), who argues that 
the development of institutions is an evolutionary process depending on generations of 
accumulated knowledge (Rosenberg, 1963). In addition, a recent article by Glaeser et al. (2004) 
also shows that human capital positively impacts institutions, “even over a relatively short 
horizon of 5 years” (p. 296). 
From an empirical standpoint, these conceptual ideas suggest that current institutions 
should be modeled as follows:  
iiiii RGHT   33,021
ˆ  (2) 
where Tˆ denotes institutions, 0H denotes the initial endowment of human capital, G is a vector of 
geographical variables (e.g. mean temperature, absolute latitude, and coastal area), R is a vector 
of “other” exogenous determinants of institutions (e.g., colonial status or legal origin) and  is a 
vector of random disturbances.  
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Equation 2 is very similar to the empirical specification for institutions found in La Porta 
et al. (1999), McArthur and Sachs (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). However, this study 
proposes to add previously accumulated human capital as a determinant of current institutions. 
More specifically, this equation states that the initial level of human capital is an important input 
in the shaping of early institutional arrangements. 
Equations 1 and 2 form a system of equations - where T and P are endogenous - which 
links poverty to institutions. This specification implies that the origin of the legal system, 
geographically related variables and the initial human capital endowment determine current 
institutions, but are uncorrelated with current poverty rates. This setup may be contentious 
because one could argue that these variables are directly correlated with poverty even after 
controlling for institutions. This would imply that the system is not properly identified. However, 
it seems to be reasonable to presuppose that the colonial legacy directly influences current 
institutions, but has no direct effect on current poverty levels, so the colonial legacy variables 
should not be correlated with the error term of equation 2. In other words, the effect from the 
colonial legacy is felt through the impact on current institutions rather than directly influencing 
current poverty. Additionally, as argued previously, the initial human capital endowment may 
have affected early institutions, which ultimately shaped current institutions. Because current 
poverty is a function of contemporary institutions this variable could have an indirect effect on 
poverty via current institutions. Finally, geography-related variables may have a direct effect on 
current institutions as well as a direct effect on poverty. Because this is an empirical question, it 
is examined together with the estimation of the model. More specifically, we test if geography 
has a direct effect on poverty, controlling for institutional quality, by re-specifying equation 1 as 
follows: 
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tiiiti GTP ,210,
ˆ    (3) 
The concerns regarding the identification of the model constitute an empirical issue that 
can be evaluated by testing if the instruments are correlated with the error term of equation 3 
and/or equation 1. Following Acemoglu et al. (2001), this study uses the Hansen’s J test to 
examine whether the variables listed above satisfy the requirements for valid instruments. 
3.2 Instrumental Variable and Measurement Error 
Almost all economic variables are measured with error and this problem is augmented in 
this study due to the nature of the variables being studied. If an explanatory variable is measured 
with error, it is necessarily correlated with the error term. In the presence of measurement error 
OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).  According to 
Hall and Jones (1999), this problem can be addressed together with the endogeneity issue by 
using the Instrumental Variable (IV)  estimator. Consider that institutions are measured with an 
error, such that: 
   TTˆ  (4) 
where Tˆ  is unobserved institutions, T  is measured institutions and   is the measurement error. 
Substituting equation 4 into equation 3 gives: 
  itiiiT GTP   1210  
(5) 
The explanatory variables from equation 2 and 3 can be stacked in a matrix X=[H0  R]. If 
X is a valid instrument for T , then E[X’v] = 0. Assuming that   is uncorrelated with v and X, 
thus 
1  is identified by the orthogonality conditions and both the measurement error and the 
endogeneity concerns are addressed. Therefore, it is crucial for the reliability of estimates to 
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select variables to instrument institutions that are uncorrelated with the error term of the second-
stage regressions.  
3.3 Data 
This study uses poverty data from the 2007 World Development Indicators (WDI). We 
utilize a poverty measure that considers the percentage of the population living on less than 
PPP$2 a day as the dependent variable.  For several countries, the poverty statistics are not 
available for all years, so we utilize the average poverty measures from 2000 to 2004. Table 1 
lists the countries included in our analysis, which are mostly developing countries due to 
restrictions in the poverty dataset. However, the WDI dataset will not report poverty rates (at the 
PPP $2 threshold) for developed countries, limiting the number of countries that might be 
included in the empirical analysis. As an alternative to WDI dataset, we also used poverty rates 
(national poverty threshold) data from the CIA world factbook. 
<<Insert Table 1 about here >> 
The measures of quality of institutions were taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001) and 
Kauffman et al. (2007).
1
  Expropriation Risk, a measure of risk of confiscation and forced 
nationalization, is used to conform to other studies in the growth and institutions literature. It is 
calculated as the average value for each country over the period 1985-1995 and ranges between 0 
and 10.  Higher scores representing better institutions, thus lower risk of confiscation or forced 
nationalization. This variable is originally obtained from Political Risk Services, and taken as 
reported in McArthur and Sachs (2001).  Kauffman et al. (2007) provides six other measures of 
institutions: Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, 
                                                 
1
 Glaeser at al. (2004) argue that these measures of institutions (Risk of Expropriation, Control of Corruption, Rule 
of Law and Regulatory Quality are actually “outcome” measures rather than “deep” measures of institutions. 
Because this is a valid argument, we use instruments to account for the endogeneity of these variables (see 
Acemoglu et al. 2005 for a detailed discussion on this issue).  
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Voice and Accountability, 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence. These variables range 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores indicating better institutional arrangements. This study 
utilizes an average index through the time periods of 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2005.
2
  
The geographic variables are taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001) and La Porta et al. 
(1999). We use i) mean temperature, which measures the 1987 mean annual temperature in 
Celsius; ii) coastal land, which quantifies the proportion of land area within 100 km of the coast 
and iii) latitude, which quantifies the absolute value of the latitude, is scaled to take values 
between 0 and 1. The colonial legacy is taken from La Porta et al. (1999) and measured by a set 
of dummy variables that identify the origin of a country’s legal system. Specifically, these 
dummies identify if the origin of the legal system is English, French, German, Scandinavian, or 
Socialist. We also take Ethnolinguistic fragmentation from La Porta et al. (1999). 
The idea that the development of institutions is an evolutionary process depending on 
previously accumulated knowledge is accounted for in the empirical model by including a 
variable that measures human capital accumulation in the early 20
th
 century. This variable is 
calculated as the number of students in school per square kilometer in 1920.  
                                                 
2  Six measures of institution (Worldwide Governance Indicators) based on Kauffman et al. (2007):  
i)   Regulatory Quality “includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate 
bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and 
business development”.  
ii)  Rule of Law includes “several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which 
fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and importantly, the extent to which property rights 
are protected”  
iii)  Control of Corruption “measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for 
private gain…. The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private 
citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions and hence 
represents a failure of governance according to our definition”  
iv)  Voice and Accountability measures “the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”   
v)   Political Stability and Absence of Violence measure “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”  
vi)  Government Effectiveness measures “the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies”  
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ii,0i,0 areahH                           (6) 
where 0h denotes the number of students’ in school in 1920, area  denotes the country land area, 
and i indexes countries. 
Data on students’ enrolled in primary and secondary schools in early 20th century are 
from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Mitchell provides these statistics back to the eighteenth 
century for only a few countries. A representative cross-country sample can be only collected 
around 1920. Mitchell reports the number of children enrolled in primary and secondary schools 
for 68 countries in 1920 and statistics for 52 countries around the 1930s. Therefore, combining 
the actual 1920 data with estimates of the number of students enrolled in 1920 based upon the 
1930 numbers allows one to get a sample comprised of 120 countries.
3
   The country area, which 
is needed to calculate the schooling density variable, is from the United Nations and based upon 
the current geopolitical arrangement.  Countries that experienced changes in their boundaries, 
such as the former USSR republics, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Algeria and Zaire were not included in the regression analysis.
4
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Figure 3 shows that poverty rate is strongly correlated with the quality of institutions. In 
looking at the figures, one can see that developing countries with better institutions are also those 
countries with lower poverty rates. However, the simple correlations shown in these figures do 
not allow one to infer that better institutions actually reduce poverty rate due to eventual 
endogeneity. It could be the case that poverty creates economic and social conditions that 
prevent the development of good institutions, rather than the other way around.   
                                                 
3
 We use the geometric growth rates in the estimations. For instance, if a country has data on enrollment between 
1930 and 1940, the geometric growth rate between these periods is utilized to estimate enrollment back to 1920.  
 
4
 Some of the other countries were not included in our analysis either because of missing data or they did not exist in 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  
14 
 
<<Insert Figure 3 about here >> 
We address the eventual endogeneity issue by estimating a set of regressions that utilizes 
the instrumental variable method (2SLS-IV) with robust standard errors. Table 2 reports the first-
stage regression (equation 2), Table 3 shows the second-stage estimates of equation 1, and Table 
4 reports the second-stage estimates of equation 3. 
Our empirical strategy to estimate the first-stage of the model (equation 2) closely 
follows La Porta et al. (1999), Acemoglu (2001), Rodrik (2000) and Tebaldi and Elmslie (2008).  
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that historical levels of human capital, geography, and 
the origin of the legal system are important determinants of current institutions and explain about 
60 percent of the variation in the alternative measures of institutions. More precisely, in all 
regressions, while controlling for geographically related variables and legal origin, human capital 
density in the early 20th century have a positive and statistically significant influence on  all 
measures of institutions (except Political Stability).  This indicates that countries that 
accumulated relatively more human capital in the early 20
th
 century turns out to have better 
current institutions. In addition, as expected, socialist legal origin is associated with relatively 
poor institutions. The regressions also suggest that the Scandinavian legal origin over performs 
the common legal system (British).  Overall, the French, German and British legal systems 
perform comparably in terms of affects on current institutions. As pointed out earlier in section 
3, La Porta et al (1999), however, found that countries with French or socialist laws show signs 
of inferior institutional structure.  Further, controlling for other covariates, we find that the 
coefficient on ethnolinguistic fragmentation is not significant, which suggests that this variable 
does not impact the quality of current institutions. This result too contradicts La Porta et al. 
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(1999); where they found that ethnolinguistically heterogenous countries show signs of mediocre 
institutional performance.  
<<Insert Table 2 about here >> 
Table 3 reports the second-stage regressions of institutions on poverty and allows to 
answer the question: does the quality of institutions impact poverty rates in developing 
countries? Columns 1 through 7 of Table 3 show that controlling for endogeneity, the quality of 
institutions is negatively related to poverty rates. More precisely, developing countries with 
better institutional arrangements - measured by control of corruption, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, government effectiveness, voice and accountability and political stability – have lower 
poverty rates. These results are consistent with Chong and Calderon’s (2000b) study, which 
found that efficient institutions reduce the level, rigor, and prevalence of poverty. The results are 
also consistent with the theoretical literature discussed in section II.  
<<Insert Table 3 about here >> 
Does geography have a direct effect on poverty? The first set of regressions reported in 
Table 3 only accounts for the indirect effect of geography on poverty through current 
institutions, but it might be the case that geography has both indirect and direct effects on 
poverty. Table 4 addresses this issue and reports a set of regressions that allows one to test if - 
controlling for institutional quality - geography has a direct effect on poverty. We find mixed 
results. Columns 1 through 4 of Table 4 show that geography (absolute latitude) has no direct 
effect on poverty rates when we control for corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
government effectiveness. This result suggests that all of the impacts of geography on poverty 
are passed on through the affects of geography on the quality of current institutions measured by 
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these variables. However, column 5 of Table 4 suggests that geography might still play a role 
when we control for voice and accountability.  
<<Insert Table 4 about here >> 
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 show that political stability and expropriation risk are no 
longer significant when we control for the direct effect of geography on poverty rates. Two 
possible explanations may support these results: First, political stability may be obtained through 
political systems that do not promote the set of conditions needed to generate economic growth 
and/or distribute the benefits of economic growth to all groups in the society. In particular, some 
stable political systems are designed to protect the elites or their political cronies in detriment to 
the needy population who might be deprived of basic needs. With respect to the insignificant 
expropriation risk coefficient, one could argue that protecting property rights only is not 
sufficient to put in place the forces and conditions needed to eliminate the deep-rooted conditions 
that create and replicate poverty in developing countries. In addition, regardless of political 
stability and protection of property rights, it might be the case that geographical conditions of a 
society determine the yield and productivity of the agricultural sector, which a majority of poor 
rely on.  Overall, this interpretation of the results might actually help us to identify which set of 
institutions is more conducive to reduce poverty rates because it suggests that Control of 
Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and Voice and 
Accountability do impact and reduce poverty rates. Conversely, political stability and 
expropriation risk seem to not affect poverty in developing countries. A comparison of the 
coefficients reported in table 4 also suggest that Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law and Government Effectiveness have much stronger effects on poverty rates than Voice 
and Accountability. 
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 A second possible explanation for the results discussed above is that the regressions on 
risk of expropriation and political stability might violate some of the statistical properties needed 
to properly estimate the model. For instance, if the model is not properly identified, then the 
estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To examine the robustness of the estimates and 
alleviate concerns with the validity of the instruments, this study follows Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
and Alcala and Ciccone (2004) and utilizes the Hansen's J statistic (Hansen, 1982) to evaluate 
the overidentifying restrictions in the IV regressions. The overidentification tests suggest that the 
correlation between the instruments and the error term in models 1 through 5 of Tables 2 and 3 is 
not significant. This result provides evidence that the regressions for control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and government effectiveness are robust too. However, the 
overidentification test does cast some doubt that the models for expropriation risk and political 
stability (columns 6 and 7 of Tables 3 and 4) are correctly identified; so those results should be 
interpreted with extra caution.  
Further, we perform a set of alternative regression using different dataset.  We examine 
the reliability of the results above by estimating regressions of poverty rates measured using the 
national poverty thresholds data from CIA world factbook for a larger sample of 89 countries 
(compare to the PPP$2 a day measure of 53 countries in Table 4).  Table 5 reports the results and 
corroborates much of the findings above.  However, one interesting point to note is that 
expropriation risk and political stability turn out to be significant at the one percent and ten 
percent levels respectively.  The overidentification test for expropriation risk and political 
stability (columns 6 and 7 of Tables 5) becomes significant too, indicating the models are 
correctly identified.  
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 In addition, we run regressions of poverty rates using Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) to extract the first eigenvalue of six measures of institutions used in this study.  PCA 
entails the calculation of the eigenvalue decomposition of a data covariance matrix after 
centering the data on average for each attribute of institutions. The result of the first PCA is 
presented in table 6.  The analysis transforms multidimensional data to a new synchronized 
system (weighted Institutions) such that the greatest variance moves to a point on the first 
coordinate. The results indicate weighted institutions are highly negatively significant in 
affecting poverty at the 1% level in both datasets, which substantiates previous results. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study makes a systematic effort to provide a theoretical link between the role of 
institutions and poverty. We further contribute to the extant literature by empirically analyzing 
the links between poverty and institutions. Using seven alternative measures of institutions, we 
assess empirically the cross-country impacts of the quality of institutions on poverty. The 
estimates obtained using instrumental variable method (2SLS) demonstrates that the quality of 
institutions is negatively related with poverty rates and explains a significant portion of the 
variation in poverty across countries.  
These results provide evidence that some institutions are more conducive to affect 
poverty than others. More precisely, the empirical results suggest that an economy with a robust 
system to control corruption, market-friendly policies, working judiciary system and in which 
people have freedom to exercise their citizenship will create the necessary conditions to promote 
economic growth and reduce poverty in developing countries. 
This article suggests that a broad strategy that includes improvements in the quality of 
institutions is needed to fight poverty. In particular, transfer and/or aid programs will only have 
19 
 
limited and short term effects on poverty if the fundamental poverty-causing factors; i.e. the 
quality of institutions, were not addressed as part of the strategy to eradicate poverty. In this 
sense, it would be helpful if international institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations, 
and IMF could use their financial and political influences to promote strategies aimed at 
improving institutions. In summary, in terms of policy implications of the study, this paper 
suggests that pro-poor policies aimed at reducing poverty should first consider improving the 
quality of institutions in developing countries as a pre-requisite for economic development and 
poverty eradication.  
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Table 1: Selected Variables 
 
Country Code 
Pov  
WDI 
Pov  
CIA 
VA PS GE RL RQ CC Country Code 
Pov 
WDI 
Pov 
CIA 
VA PS GE RL RQ CC 
Afghanistan AFG - 53.0 -1.51 -2.26 -1.25 -1.68 -2.12 -1.41 Libya LBY - 7.4 -1.75 -0.6 -1.04 -0.89 -1.84 -0.9 
Angola AGO - 70.0 -1.3 -1.61 -1.34 -1.42 -1.4 -1.2 Sri Lanka LKA 41.6 22.0 -0.24 -1.43 -0.27 0.01 0.22 -0.23 
Argentina ARG 18.2 23.4 0.37 -0.14 0.01 -0.34 -0.13 -0.43 Morocco MAR 14.3  -0.58 -0.32 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.02 
Austria AUT - 5.9 1.25 1.08 1.77 1.88 1.43 1.97 Madagascar MDG 87.7 50.0 0.1 0.05 -0.46 -0.54 -0.21 -0.18 
Burundi BDI - 68.0 -1.34 -2.09 -1.26 -1.1 -1.24 -0.97 Mexico MEX 18.5 13.8 0.1 -0.27 0.1 -0.38 0.48 -0.34 
Belgium BEL - 15.2 1.32 0.79 1.68 1.46 1.17 1.41 Mali MLI 72.1 36.1 0.31 0.06 -0.49 -0.46 -0.19 -0.36 
Benin BEN 73.7 37.4 0.38 0.32 -0.32 -0.43 -0.35 -0.55 Myanmar MMR - 70.0 -2.09 -1.28 -1.45 -1.48 -1.75 -1.4 
Burkina Faso BFA 71.8 46.4 -0.36 -0.23 -0.55 -0.59 -0.29 -0.2 Mozambique MOZ 74.1 15.0 -0.18 -0.1 -0.46 -0.82 -0.52 -0.7 
Bangladesh BGD 84.0 45.0 -0.48 -0.94 -0.65 -0.8 -0.73 -0.9 Mauritania MRT 63.1 40.0 -0.91 -0.02 -0.1 -0.54 -0.27 -0.16 
Bulgaria BGR 9.5 14.1 0.46 0.19 -0.23 -0.15 0.42 -0.26 Mauritius MUS - 8.0 0.96 0.9 0.62 0.8 0.44 0.39 
Bolivia BOL 43.2 60.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.45 -0.6 0.21 -0.76 Malawi MWI 62.9 53.0 -0.41 -0.08 -0.68 -0.42 -0.34 -0.76 
Brazil BRA 22.1 31.0 0.37 -0.16 -0.08 -0.3 0.19 -0.07 Malaysia MYS - 5.1 -0.3 0.34 0.85 0.55 0.54 0.39 
Canada CAN - 10.8 1.31 0.97 2.01 1.81 1.41 2.15 Niger NER - 63.0 -0.34 -0.34 -0.92 -0.91 -0.61 -0.85 
Chile CHL 7.6 18.2 0.88 0.71 1.26 1.2 1.36 1.36 Nigeria NGA 92.4 70.0 -0.94 -1.63 -1.06 -1.37 -0.97 -1.24 
China CHN 42.0 8.0 -1.54 -0.13 0.09 -0.41 -0.25 -0.4 Nicaragua NIC 79.9 48.0 -0.02 -0.25 -0.69 -0.77 -0.12 -0.56 
Ivory Coast CIV 48.8 42.0 -1.14 -1.45 -0.79 -1.07 -0.48 -0.72 Netherlands NLD - 10.5 1.48 1.16 2.18 1.84 1.67 2.2 
Cameroon CMR 50.6 48.0 -1.11 -0.7 -0.74 -1.08 -0.61 -1.09 Pakistan PAK 69.7 24.0 -1.16 -1.42 -0.55 -0.73 -0.66 -0.93 
Colombia COL 20.2 49.2 -0.39 -1.87 -0.13 -0.73 0.11 -0.45 Panama PAN 17.7 37.0 0.51 0.18 -0.09 -0.06 0.56 -0.31 
Costa Rica CRI 9.2 16.0 1.16 0.87 0.44 0.65 0.71 0.73 Peru PER 33.5 44.5 -0.21 -0.85 -0.32 -0.59 0.34 -0.28 
Germany DEU - 11.0 1.34 0.9 1.71 1.78 1.36 1.92 Philippines PHL 45.2 30.0 0.16 -0.76 0 -0.46 0.16 -0.49 
Dominican Republic DOM 14.1 42.2 0.18 -0.05 -0.45 -0.46 -0.03 -0.48 Poland POL 2.0 17.0 1.05 0.47 0.62 0.46 0.64 0.35 
Algeria DZA - 25.0 -1.15 -1.95 -0.62 -0.74 -0.75 -0.59 Portugal PRT - 18.0 1.3 1.1 1.14 1.2 1.2 1.31 
Ecuador ECU - 38.3 -0.05 -0.89 -0.92 -0.68 -0.39 -0.87 Paraguay PRY 31.1 32.0 -0.41 -0.76 -1.06 -0.96 -0.43 -1.08 
Egypt EGY 43.9 20.0 -0.97 -0.61 -0.19 0.05 -0.28 -0.26 Romania ROM 16.7 25.0 0.3 0.12 -0.4 -0.28 -0.08 -0.33 
Spain ESP - 19.8 1.11 0.45 1.62 1.2 1.23 1.38 Rwanda RWA 87.8 60.0 -1.41 -1.49 -0.75 -0.85 -0.82 -0.44 
Ethiopia ETH 77.8 38.7 -0.98 -1.18 -0.66 -0.52 -0.93 -0.58 Sudan SDN - 40.0 -1.8 -2.26 -1.35 -1.43 -1.23 -1.18 
France FRA - 6.2 1.21 0.58 1.6 1.4 1.02 1.47 Senegal SEN 56.2 54.0 -0.04 -0.54 -0.12 -0.26 -0.28 -0.38 
United Kingdom GBR - 14.0 1.32 0.63 2.05 1.81 1.61 2.07 Sierra Leone SLE - 70.2 -0.98 -1.46 -1.2 -1.09 -1.08 -0.98 
Ghana GHA - 28.5 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.2 -0.1 -0.41 El Salvador SLV 39.9 30.7 0.14 -0.05 -0.3 -0.46 0.5 -0.42 
Guinea GIN - 47.0 -1.18 -1.15 -0.79 -1.02 -0.53 -0.62 Syria SYR - 11.9 -1.67 -0.6 -0.94 -0.44 -0.98 -0.6 
Guatemala GTM 31.1 56.2 -0.44 -0.9 -0.61 -0.91 0.1 -0.81 Chad TCD - 80.0 -1.01 -1.31 -0.75 -0.94 -0.67 -1.01 
Honduras HND 39.8 50.7 -0.08 -0.38 -0.65 -0.83 -0.18 -0.79 Togo TGO - 32.0 -1.18 -0.63 -1.14 -1.02 -0.52 -0.77 
Haiti HTI 78.0 80.0 -1.06 -1.29 -1.46 -1.53 -1.15 -1.32 Thailand THA 29.7 10.0 0.14 -0.05 0.3 0.19 0.34 -0.32 
Hungary HUN 2.0 8.6 1.09 0.81 0.72 0.73 1 0.64 Trinidad And Tobago TTO - 17.0 0.59 0.19 0.47 0.18 0.66 0.1 
Indonesia IDN 53.9 17.8 -0.69 -1.54 -0.41 -0.86 -0.35 -0.94 Tunisia TUN 6.6 7.4 -0.92 0.21 0.64 0.21 0.14 0.27 
Ireland IRL - 7.0 1.36 1.15 1.69 1.65 1.54 1.73 Turkey TUR 14.5 20.0 -0.44 -0.98 -0.01 -0.02 0.26 -0.17 
Israel ISR - 21.6 0.74 -1.12 1.11 0.9 0.89 1.08 Tanzania TZA 89.9 36.0 -0.43 -0.34 -0.55 -0.48 -0.29 -0.9 
Jamaica JAM 15.1 14.8 0.56 -0.11 -0.18 -0.42 0.33 -0.43 Uganda UGA - 35.0 -0.72 -1.4 -0.38 -0.69 0.09 -0.8 
Jordan JOR 7.0 14.2 -0.49 -0.19 0.27 0.37 0.27 0.17 Uruguay URY 4.8 27.4 0.89 0.64 0.56 0.46 0.59 0.64 
Kenya KEN - 50.0 -0.54 -1.04 -0.74 -1 -0.32 -1.03 United States USA - 12.0 1.26 0.47 1.77 1.64 1.43 1.76 
Cambodia KHM 89.8 35.0 -0.76 -0.75 -0.77 -0.98 -0.41 -1.01 Venezuela VEN 34.0 37.9 -0.27 -1 -0.91 -1.01 -0.68 -0.91 
Korea, South KOR - 15.0 0.69 0.21 0.8 0.68 0.61 0.31 Vietnam VNM - 14.8 -1.54 0.28 -0.31 -0.61 -0.61 -0.73 
Laos LAO 74.1 30.7 -1.53 -0.12 -0.69 -1.14 -1.26 -0.96 South Africa ZAF 34.1 50.0 0.79 -0.48 0.56 0.17 0.38 0.47 
Lebanon LBN - 28.0 -0.65 -0.83 -0.27 -0.26 -0.06 -0.42 Zambia ZMB 90.8 86.0 -0.3 -0.29 -0.75 -0.55 -0.27 -0.84 
Liberia LBR - 80.0 -1.3 -2.04 -1.7 -1.76 -1.9 -1.31 Zimbabwe ZWE - 68.0 -1.25 -1.32 -0.94 -1.05 -1.62 -0.9 
Source: World Development Indicators 2007, CIA Fact Book, and Kauffman et al. (2007). 
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Table 2:  The Determinants of Current Institutions 
 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable 
Control of 
Corruption 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Expropriation 
Risk 
 Coefficients 
Legal Origin – Socialist -0.898*** -0.492 -0.785*** -0.709** -0.613* 0.254 -0.463 
  (0.26) (0.30) (0.25) (0.29) (0.32) (0.27) (0.53) 
Legal Origin – French -0.284 -0.0766 -0.276 -0.284 -0.0130 0.0615 -0.286 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.16) (0.20) (0.36) 
Legal Origin – German 0.404 0.224 0.489* 0.381 0.299 0.679** 0.769** 
  (0.36) (0.25) (0.27) (0.30) (0.21) (0.28) (0.39) 
Legal Origin – Scandinavian 0.741** 0.422 0.452* 0.430 0.496* 0.621** 0.622 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.44) 
Human Capital Density in the early 20th century 0.0798** 0.124*** 0.0969*** 0.0912** 0.142*** 0.0446 0.282*** 
 (0.037) (0.043) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.035) (0.071) 
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation. -0.167 0.0123 -0.000847 0.0435 0.269 0.0653 0.495 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.34) (0.73) 
Absolute latitude 2.794*** 1.598*** 2.762*** 2.794*** 1.948*** 2.225*** 3.908*** 
 (0.62) (0.61) (0.52) (0.61) (0.56) (0.51) (0.99) 
Prop. land within 100 km of the sea coast 0.276 0.354 0.303 0.378 0.273 0.568** -0.293 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.52) 
Constant -0.519 -0.298 -0.611** -0.565* -0.564* -1.180*** 6.359*** 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.74) 
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 97 
R-squared 0.65 0.54 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.48 0.56 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
                      Common (British) Law is used as an omitted category. 
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Table 3:  IV Regressions of Poverty Rates (PPP $2) on Institutions 
 
COEFFICIENT Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
        
Control of Corruption  61.99***       
 (11.0)       
Regulatory Quality   -63.33***      
  (11.7)      
Rule of Law   -55.38***     
   (10.1)     
Government Effectiveness    -62.06***    
    (10.6)    
Voice and Accountability     -45.70***   
     (9.50)   
Political Stability      -41.46***  
      (11.7)  
Expropriation Risk       -15.68*** 
       (3.82) 
Constant 19.45*** 39.03*** 21.58*** 27.14*** 34.76*** 27.13*** 142.2*** 
 (6.35) (3.17) (4.84) (4.89) (4.16) (5.03) (25.8) 
Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 48 
Uncentered R-squared 0.744 0.823 0.789 0.793 0.696 0.670 0.804 
Hansen  J-statistic overidentification test 3.561 6.213 7.006 6.867 8.426 8.614 13.69 
Hansen  J – p-value 0.614 0.286 0.220 0.231 0.134 0.126 0.0177 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in models 1-7 is the average poverty rates between 1999-2004; all regressions were ran with standard errors 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV first-stage regressions are estimated including the following set of variables: ln human 
capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, absolute latitude, proportion of land within 100 
km of the seacoast, and ethnolinguistic fragmentation. 
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Table 4:  IV Regressions of Poverty Rates (PPP $2) on Institutions and Geography 
 
Variable Model 1 Model  2 Model  3 Model 4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
        
Control of Corruption  -66.10***       
 (21.6)       
Regulatory Quality   -54.31***      
  (13.8)      
Rule of Law   -65.05***     
   (23.6)     
Government Effectiveness    -86.29**    
    (37.3)    
Voice and Accountability     -32.83***   
     (8.21)   
Political Stability      -21.41  
      (18.2)  
Expropriation Risk       1.583 
       (7.84) 
Absolute Latitude 11.45 -29.72 26.35 58.77 -62.32** -62.72 -106.1*** 
 (47.4) (24.1) (52.3) (82.2) (25.4) (43.2) (40.8) 
Constant 15.31 46.26*** 11.88 7.653 51.03*** 49.07*** 54.48 
 (20.0) (6.61) (21.5) (28.8) (6.66) (17.3) (42.8) 
Observations 53 53 53 53 53 53 48 
Uncentered R-squared 0.720 0.861 0.742 0.651 0.794 0.777 0.742 
Hansen  J-statistic overidentification test 3.226 5.263 5.904 3.774 6.945 11.22 8.804 
Hansen  J – p-value 0.521 0.261 0.206 0.437 0.139 0.0243 0.0662 
Notes:  ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in models 1-7 is the average poverty rates between 1999-2004; all regressions were ran with standard errors 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV first-stage regressions are estimated including the following set of variables: ln human 
capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, absolute latitude, proportion of land within 100 
km of the seacoast, and ethnolinguistic fragmentation 
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Table 5:  IV Regressions of Poverty Rates (National Poverty Threshold) on Institutions and Geography 
 
Variable Model 1 Model  2 Model  3 Model 4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
        
Control of Corruption  -11.22**       
 (4.64)       
Regulatory Quality   -11.72***      
  (4.31)      
Rule of Law   -10.93***     
   (4.18)     
Government Effectiveness    -11.88***    
    (4.46)    
Voice and Accountability     -9.489**   
     (3.90)   
Political Stability      -21.79***  
      (7.69)  
Expropriation Risk       -3.368* 
       (1.99) 
Absolute Latitude -27.92 -40.22*** -29.41* -26.96 -43.52*** -9.041 -45.95*** 
 (19.0) (14.1) (17.0) (18.3) (13.6) (24.0) (13.7) 
Constant 38.41*** 43.07*** 38.49*** 39.04*** 42.87*** 27.08*** 67.32*** 
 (5.82) (4.00) (5.36) (5.22) (4.35) (8.84) (11.0) 
Observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 80 
Uncentered R-squared 0.841 0.856 0.858 0.861 0.824 0.811 0.837 
Hansen  J-statistic overidentification test 6.396 4.118 6.408 6.432 4.442 2.493 8.140 
Hansen  J – p-value 0.270 0.532 0.269 0.266 0.488 0.778 0.149 
Notes:  ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in models 1-7 is the average poverty rates between 1999-2004; all regressions were ran with standard errors 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV first-stage regressions are estimated including the following set of variables: ln human 
capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, absolute latitude, proportion of land within 100 
km of the seacoast, and ethnolinguistic fragmentation 
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Table 6:  IV Regressions of Poverty Rates Using Principal Component-Weighted Institutions 
 
Variables WDI dataset CIA dataset 
Weighted Institutions -32.10*** -5.249*** 
 (10.9) (1.89) 
Absolute Latitude 36.24 -28.95* 
 (54.5) (17.3) 
Constant 12.95 38.40*** 
 (20.2) (5.25) 
Observations 53 89 
Uncentered R-squared 0.720 0.856 
Hansen  J-statistic overidentification test 2.359 5.204 
Hansen  J – p-value 0.670 0.391 
    Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% respectively.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in models 1-7 is the average poverty rates between 1999-2004; all regressions were ran with standard errors 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All IV first-stage regressions are estimated including the following set of variables: ln human 
capital density in the early 20th century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, absolute latitude, proportion of land within 100 
km of the seacoast, and ethnolinguistic fragmentation 
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Figure 1: Institutions and Poverty Traps 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tebaldi and Mohan (2008).   
Note: y denotes output per worker, k is capital per worker,  
          s is the savings rates, and T is an index denoting quality of institutions. 
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Figure 2: Institutions and Poverty 
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Figure 3: Poverty and Quality of Institutions  
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 Source: Authors’ compilation  
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Figure 3: Poverty and Quality of Institutions (cont) 
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                 Source: Authors’ compilation 
